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Abstract
The present study supported the network contagion
theory that healthcare providers are more likely to
adopt the Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health
Record (EHR) incentive program when their direct
relations have more prior adopters. Spatial contagion,
however, exhibits an opposite finding that healthcare
providers geographically surrounded by more prior
adopters are less likely to adopt the EHR incentive
program. When taking both network contagion and
spatial contagion into account, healthcare providers
connected with more prior adopters within 30 miles are
more likely to adopt the EHR incentive program. The
findings enrich our understanding of how network
contagion influences the diffusion of EHR incentive
programs and how spatial contagion moderates the
effects of network contagion on the diffusion of the EHR
incentive programs.

1. Introduction
Health information technology (HIT) are the
electronic systems that health care professionals and
patients use to store, share and analyze health
information. HIT has been widely applied to support
healthcare systems and improve cost-effectiveness,
efficiency, quality and safety of healthcare delivery [1].
The benefits of implementing HIT include automatizing
labor-intensive work, minimizing human errors,
speeding laboratory report deliveries, digitalizing
patient records, and enhancing decision making and
knowledge acquisition. Among those HIT, the
electronic health records (EHRs) system is deemed as
the most significant step in computerizing healthcare
information systems. However, the adoption of the
EHRs system had been less than 45 percent until 2009.
The most common barriers for healthcare providers or
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hospitals in adopting EHRs included misaligned
incentives, limited purchasing power among healthcare
providers, the viability of EHR products and companies,
and lack of demonstrated value of EHRs in practice [2].
In 2011, the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive
Programs (now known as the Promoting Interoperability
Programs) were established to facilitate the adoption
and meaningful use of certified EHR technology in
ambulatory practices and hospitals. The EHR incentive
programs detail three stages that healthcare providers
need to go through to be eligible for the monetary
payments. The first stage expects the participants to
establish the EHR infrastructure for the electronic
extraction of clinical data. The second stage expects the
participants to ensure the meaningful use of EHRs. The
final stage expects the participants to produce better
clinical outcomes and quality of care. 1 The eligible
participates (professionals and hospitals) are defined by
the EHR incentive program. 2 When the participants
complete each stage, monetary payments are given.
The current program evaluation mostly relies on
conventional survey methods to investigate obstacles
that the participants have encountered [3], [4]. The
survey evaluations assume that the respondents make
their decisions on the EHR incentive program adoption
independently by assessing its cost-benefit without
taking other healthcare providers' behavior into account.
The policy recommendations made based on the
findings of such evaluation studies do not reflect the
prior research on medical diffusions, which informed us,
for instance, that healthcare provider networks are likely
to influence the diffusion of new drugs through either
direct (network contagion) or indirect healthcare
provider relationships (structural equivalence) [5], [6].
However, structural equivalence (i.e., similar network
positions, e.g., measured by a focal actor's distance
relations to other actors) is useful typically when a
2
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network is well-connected, but it serves little utility
when a network is fragmented (i.e., not able to calculate
the distance between actors based on unconnected
relations). It should be expected that a similar process
would be observed in the diffusion/adoption of the EHR
incentive programs in healthcare provider networks.
Moreover, spatial proximity or spatial interaction
between healthcare providers would affect the
adoption/diffusion process of the EHR incentive
programs. Spatial proximity creates a space where
mimetic behaviors and localized knowledge spillovers
are possible and more likely through informal
communications between healthcare providers [7]. The
EHR incentive program information may be shared in
healthcare provider networks and influences healthcare
providers' decisions on program participation. Hence,
this study aims to understand how healthcare providers’
network contagion and spatial proximity collectively
determine the adoption/participation of the EHR
incentive programs.
The program participation data used in this study
were downloaded from the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human
Services. The present study focused on 17,756 eligible
healthcare providers between 2011 and 2015 in two
hospital referral regions (HRR), Arlington areas (HRR
code: 426), and Washington areas (HRR code:113). The
provider patient-sharing networks, measured by referral
relations, were constructed to examine how the program
participation spreads in the healthcare provider
networks. Survival analysis was used to estimate the
program diffusion process.

2. Literature reviews
The adoption of technology as the adoption of an
institution has been studied extensively in Information
System research, e.g., enterprise resource planning
systems or electronic trading systems [8]. For example,
Sherer et al. used nationally representative data in 2008
and 2012 to examine how institutional pressures
influence the diffusion of EHRs [9]. The findings
indicated that the mimetic process was a critical
predictor of EHRs adoption in a highly uncertain
environment in 2008. The coercive process became a
significant predictor of EHRs adoption in 2012 after
HITECH was enacted in 2009. The normative process
has continually influenced the adoption of EHRs before
and after 2009. Another research surveyed 191 U.S.
healthcare employees enrolled in the online healthcare
MBA program, and the findings showed that the
mimetic and coercive pressures do not have direct and
significant effects on the level of EMR adoption. The
normative and mimetic pressures have indirect effects
on the level of EHR adoption through top management

participation (i.e., mediation effect) [10]. The
inconclusive results of institution pressures on EHRs
adoption may be caused by different research designs,
sampling methods, population, and measures of
institutional pressures. In addition to the institutional
perspective, other studies also found that the adoption
process of EHRs is substantially varied by healthcare
providers' specialties [11] and networks [12], hospital
scale, hospital ownerships and locations (urban vs.
rural) [3], [13], performance expectancy, facilitating or
inhibiting conditions [14]. However, those studies paid
little attention to the role of healthcare provider
networks in the adoption/participation of the Medicare
and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs, which is
deemed as an important stimulus for the increase of the
EHR adoption rate in the U.S. Thus, this study attempts
to examine how social contagion, spatial proximity, and
the joint effect of social contagion and spatial proximity
affect the adoption of EHR incentive program.

2.1. Social contagion and network
Social contagion theory is one of the underlying
theories to elucidate how the spread of new ideas or
practices is contingent on the way in which social
proximity brings adopters and non-adopters together.
Social proximity of innovations is expressed in two
pathways to manage the uncertainty of costs and
benefits: cohesion and structural equivalence [5], [6].
The cohesion approach argues that direct contacts and
more frequent communication between adopters and
non-adopters are a socialization process where adopters
and non-adopters establish a normative understanding
of the cost-benefit of adopting an innovation. When
non-adopters are confronted with a need to make a
decision in a vague situation, non-adopters would seek
advice from whom they have established trust to discuss
the innovation matter [15]. The contagion phenomena
have been continuously found in the topics of the spread
of options, attitudes, or behavior in communication
networks [16]. Following this theory, our first
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Network contagion is positively
associated with the adoption of the EHR incentive
program.

2.2. Spatial proximity and network
The structural equivalence model holds a
contradictory perspective stating that people would
compete for "survival" and mimic or learn from each
other when they occupy similar social structure
positions but are not necessarily have a direct contact.
For example, two primary care physicians compete to
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serve as a new drug advisor in the healthcare market, or
two graduate students, trained by the same academic
advisor, compete for publications to earn their degrees.
The structural equivalence model depicts that nonadopters are likely to become adopters when nonadopters maintain similar social positions as adopters
[5]. The concept of structural equivalence has been
extended to different measures of structural proximity.
For example, Angst et al. investigated how prior
adopters, social proximity, and spatial proximity
influence the adoption of EHRs. Social proximity was
operationalized as hospitals in the same health system,
and spatial proximity was calculated based on the
Euclidian distance between two hospitals' zip codes
[17].
Spatial proximity as a predictor of the diffusion of
adoption has demonstrated robust evidence. The
arguments of spatial proximity follow a series of
propositions. Companies consider location choices as a
means of achieving economic benefits, such as the
reduction of logistic or production costs, possibilities of
recruiting skillful or low-cost employees, or
opportunities of R&D collaboration with universities.
Because of chasing similar economic incentives,
companies with homogeneous features are likely to
cluster in the same area, e.g., industrial parks [7].
However, the mechanism of information diffusions
among companies is not merely based on homogeneous
characteristics. Both competition and interaction play
different roles in facilitating the diffusion of
innovations. From the competition viewpoint, clustered
companies with similar features are likely to form a
competitive environment. Spatial proximity creates
more opportunities for managers to observe and notice
the incidence of innovation adoption from their rival
companies. The diffusion of innovations is motivated by
competition, and the diffusion process is based on
mimicking behavior. From the interaction perspective,
spatial proximity creates more opportunities for
employees to initiate informal interactions and
information exchange with other employees from rival
companies. The information may be conveyed back to
those employees’ companies and form a decision on
innovations [18]–[20]. In addition, because tacit
knowledge is not easy to be transferred from one to
another, spatial proximity offers the opportunity to
reduce the costs and facilitate complex forms of
knowledge exchange and creation. Within a small
boundary of an area, the frequent face-to-face
interaction is a feasible means to distribute information
and clarify whether the information is valuable [21]–
[23]. Thus, in the process of knowledge transfer, spatial
proximity serves as a resolution of overcoming
institutional differences between organizations [22].
Geographically bounded and localized Individual links

and face-to-face interactions significantly contribute to
knowledge transfer [24]. Hence, we hypothesize that
healthcare providers working with other adopters in the
same area are more likely to adopt the EHR incentive
program:
Hypothesis 2: Spatial proximity is positively associated
with the adoption of the EHR incentive program
Moreover, a direct healthcare provider network
connection coupling with spatial closeness increases the
propensity for the program infection. Spatial proximity
might serve as a moderator for the spread of the EHR
incentive program from one healthcare provider to
another healthcare provider with a direct connection:
Hypothesis 3: Spatial proximity is likely to accelerate
the effect of network contagion on the adoption of the
EHR incentive program.

3. Methods
3.1. Data sources and management
To understand the effects of network contagion and
spatial proximity on the adoption of the EHR incentive
programs, this study used data from five sources:
1. EHR Products Used for Meaningful Use
Attestation Public Use File: The dataset contains
healthcare provider's participation status in the EHR
incentive program and their National Provider Identifier
(NPI).
(https://dashboard.healthit.gov/datadashboard/documen
tation/ehr-products-mu-attestation-datadocumentation.php)
2. Physician Shared Patient Patterns Data: The
dataset contains referrals from one healthcare provider
to another within a specific time frame in the Medicare
program. National Provider Identifier is used to
establish referral networks. In their study, Barnett et al.
examined the relationship between healthcare provider
self-report networks and Medicare claim-based
networks in the Boston Hospital Referral Region [25].
The results concluded that two healthcare providers
shared more Medicare patients are more likely to
increase the recognition of referral relationships and
advice relationships. Thus, using referral networks to
construct healthcare provider networks is appropriate.
(https://questions.cms.gov/faq.php?faqId=7977)
3. National Plan and Provider Enumeration System
Data: The dataset is comprised of detailed profiles of
healthcare and linked with NPIs.
(http://download.cms.gov/nppes/NPI_Files.html)
4. Hospital Referral Regions: The dataset
“represents regional health care markets for tertiary
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medical care that generally requires the services of a
major referral center. The regions were defined by
determining where patients were referred for major
cardiovascular
surgical
procedures
and
for
neurosurgery.”
(http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/tools/downloads.aspx)
5. TIGER/Line Shapefile, 2015, 2010 nation, U.S.,
2010 Census 5-Digit ZIP Code Tabulation Area
(ZCTA5) National: The 2010 shpefile is used to create a
map covering Arlington and Washington hospital
referral regions.
(https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/tiger-line-shapefile2015-2010-nation-u-s-2010-census-5-digit-zip-codetabulation-area-zcta5-na)
The present study extracted eligible NPIs registered
in the Arlington (HRR code: 426) and Washington
(HRR code: 113) hospital referral regions from the
National Plan and Provider Enumeration System
published by Dartmouth Atlas of Health. The boundary
definitions of hospital referral regions are adjusted every
year, and the most up-to-date version was published in
2014. Thus, we used the hospital referral region data
from 2011 to 2014 and included all zip codes that
appeared in any time periods in Arlington and
Washington HRRs (Table 1). As the National Plan and
Provider Enumeration System contains the NPIs’
addresses, zip codes from the system and hospital
referral regions were used as the crosswalk variable to
link healthcare provider addresses to zip codes in
Arlington and Washington HRRs (Figure 1). The total
number of zip codes was 761 representing a total of
4,986 healthcare provider’s business locations. Those
business locations were geocoded to latitude and
longitude coordinates using Census’s web service.3 Of
those 4,986 business locations, 600 addresses could not
be found on the Census web. For those unfound
locations, this study used Google Map to manually
transform those addresses to latitude and longitude
coordinates. The final data used in the analysis
contained 17,756 healthcare providers and 3,418
locations.
Table 1: Arlington and Washington hospital referral
regions
HRR Year
# of Zip Codes

2011
699

2012
705

2013
747

2014
747

Final Area
761

Figure 1: Map for hospital referral regions

To establish healthcare provider networks, the
eligible NPIs were used to select referral claim data
from the Physician Shared Patient Patterns data between
2011 and 2015. The network properties extracted from
the data are summarized in Table 2. The original data
shows that the number of edges downloaded from
Physician Shared Patient Patterns. It should be noted
that the number of referrals increased between 2011 and
2012 but decreased between 2012 and 2015. The
network size is the total number of healthcare providers
in the analysis. The total number of degrees is the
number of all referrals made from a healthcare provider
to other healthcare providers. The average degree
represents the total number of degrees divided by the
network size. The minimum degree reflects the number
of healthcare providers who did not make Medicare
claims in that year. The maximum degree represents the
maximum number of claims that the healthcare
providers made. The density represents all actual
connections divided by all theoretically possible
connections in the network. The density score ranges
from 0 to 1. A density score that is close to 1 indicating
the network is denser. A density score is close to 0
indicating the network is loose. The healthcare provider
networks here have low values of the density scores
(0.003-0.006). This is expected because a larger
network typically has a low density value than a smaller
network where network members have a higher
probability of reaching and knowing each other.
Table 2: Properties of healthcare provider networks
Network size
Total number
of degrees
Average
degree
Min degree
Max degree
Density

2011
17,756
9,48,787

2012
17,756
981,447

2013
17,756
973,305

2014
17,756
1,012,412

2015
17,756
458,768

53

55

55

57

26

0
1,413
0.0060

0
1,445
0.0062

0
1,394
0.0062

0
1,388
0.0064

0
866
0.0029

The eligible 17,756 NPIs in the Arlington and
Washington hospital referral regions were used to select
3
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healthcare providers who participated in the stage one
of the EHR incentive programs from the EHR Products
Used for Meaningful Use Attestation Public Use File.
Of those 17,756 NPIs, 5,092 NPIs participated in the
EHR incentive program.

Maryland

Virginia

3.2. Measurements
Program Adoption is a binary variable measuring
whether a healthcare provider adopted stage one of the
EHR incentive program. “1” indicates that the provider
adopted the program while “0” indicates otherwise.
Business Size is a binary variable measuring
whether an NPI business address has more than 10
healthcare providers or less than 10. “1” represents that
a healthcare provider’s business address has more than
10 healthcare providers, while “0” represents that a
healthcare provider’s business address has 10 or less
than 10 healthcare providers.
Network Contagion measures the probability of a
healthcare provider being influenced by other connected
healthcare providers for the decision to adopt the EHR
incentive program. The variable is calculated by the
summation of prior adopter/non-adopter multiplied by
weighted connections. The weighted values are
proportional to the healthcare provider’s direct
connections.
Spatial Contagion is used to measure the spatial
proximity effect of adopters on susceptible healthcare
providers. Spatial Contagion is the number of prior
adopters within 30 miles of the healthcare provider’s
business location. The decision for the 30 miles is
arbitrary. A patient's maximum distance to visit primary
care providers or specialists varies by state and whether
the provider is located in an urban or rural area (Table
3). Nonetheless, the number of primary care providers
is larger than that of specialists, and most providers are
located in urban areas, it may be reasonable to set the
maximum distance based on the primary care providers
in urban areas. Thus, the present study set the maximum
distance as 15 miles for the Arlington HRR, reflecting
that patients in the HRR are able to visit healthcare
providers within 15 miles. In other words, if a patient
lives in a place between two healthcare providers, an
optimal maximum distance between two providers is 30
miles, allowing the patient to visit them within 15 miles.
Besides, only Virginia provides patients’ traveling
information about visiting primary care providers and
specialists. In order to create a consistent measure for
the two HRRs, the present study applied Virginia’s
standards to both Arlington and Washington HRRs.
Table 3: Maximum Distance or Time an Enrollee
Should Have to Travel to See a Provider (HHS, 2014)
Primary Care Providers

District of
Columbia

Within 30 minutes’ travel time
via public
transportation or within 5 miles
Urban: Within 30 minutes or
10 miles
Rural: Within 30 minutes or 30
miles
Urban: Within 30 minutes or
15 miles
Rural: Within 60 minutes or 30
miles

No standard

No standard

Urban: Within
30 miles
Rural: Within 60
miles

3.3. Model specialization
Because the program adoption variable is a timeevent data with right censoring, the hazard modeling is
used as the main statistical method to analyze the data.
The analysis also includes time-varying variables (i.e.
network contagion and spatial proximity variables).
Thus, the random-effects parametric survival model
with the Weibull survival distribution (time duration
distribution) was chosen to test the hypotheses. The
healthcare providers in the same location are likely to
have erroneously small standard errors due to data
correlations. Thus, the clustered standard errors are used
to correct the estimation, which yields 3,418 clusters
(business locations) [26]–[29].

4. Analysis and results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 4 shows that 63% of healthcare providers are
in the business locations where there are more than 10
healthcare providers, while 37% of healthcare providers
are located in locations with less than 10 healthcare
providers. The EHR adoption rate was 4% in 2011,
increased to 12% in 2012, and then decreased to 4% in
2014 and to 2% in 2015. The total adoption rate was
28.68%, and the number of adoption was 5,092. The
cumulative adoption rate is shown in Figure 4. Besides,
the correlation coefficient between network contagion
and spatial contagion is 0.2376 (P < 0.01).
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

N

Mean/%

S.D.

Min

Max

Business Size (% of large)

17,756

63%

0.48

0

1

Adoption rate in 2011 (%)

17,756

4%

0.20

0

1

Adoption rate in 2012 (%)

17,756

12%

0.33

0

1

Adoption rate in 2013 (%)

17,756

6%

0.24

0

1

Adoption rate in 2014 (%)

17,756

4%

0.20

0

1

Adoption rate in 2015 (%)

17,756

2%

0.14

0

1

Network Contagion in 2011

17,756

0.05

0.12

0

1

Specialists
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Network Contagion in 2012

17,756

0.19

0.25

0

1

Network Contagion in 2013

17,756

0.27

0.31

0

1

Network Contagion in 2014

17,756

0.31

0.33

0

1

Network Contagion in 2015

17,756

0.27

0.34

0

1

Spatial Contagion in 2011

17,756

519.93

204.09

15

654

Spatial Contagion in 2012

17,756

1955.39

727.56

45

2482

Spatial Contagion in 2013

17,756

2677.47

1001.76

54

3364

Spatial Contagion in 2014

17,756

3161.33

1187.93

67

3999

Spatial Contagion in 2015

17,756

3406.26

1281.29

69

4317

Cumulative Adoption Rate (2011-2015)
1.00
0.80
0.60

interaction terms were statistically significant,
indicating that a large business size coupling with a high
value of network contagion tends to lead to EHR
adoption compared to a small business size with a higher
value of network contagion. Likewise, a higher value of
network contagion coupling with a higher value of
spatial contagion tends to promote the adoption EHR
incentive program compared to a lower value of
network contagion coupling with a lower value of
spatial contagion.
Finally, there are several parametric distributions,
which can be used to specify the hazard model. To
ensure that the Weibull distribution is appropriate, we
tested the goodness of fit of Gamma, Loglogistic and
Lognormal distributions for the last model (Table 6).
The table shows that the Weibull distribution has the
best goodness of fits in terms of AIC and BIC.
Table 5: Random effects Weibull regression

0.40

1
Hazard
Ratio
(SE)

0.20

2
Hazard
Ratio
(SE)

3
Hazard
Ratio
(SE)

0.00
1

2

3

4

5

Figure 4: Cumulative Program Adoption Rate from 2011
to 2015

BusinessSize

1.1236
(0.0831)

NetworkContagion t-1

2.7679***
(0.1728)

4.2. Hazard model analysis
Table 5 summarizes the results of the hazard model
analyses with different predictors for the adoption of the
EHR incentive program. The first model shows that
location size does not have a significant effect on the
adoption. The second model predicts that the adoption
rate would increase 177% with a unit increase in the
network contagion measure. The adoption rate would
decrease by 0.05% with a unit increase in spatial
contagion. The fourth model includes all three
predictors. The results indicate that all predictors are
statistically significant. Business size and network
contagion are positively associated with the adoption of
the EHR incentive program, but spatial contagion is
negatively associated. The fact that the business size is
statistically insignificant in the first model while it has a
statistically significant positive effect in the third model
indicates that business size is likely to have interaction
effects with other predictors.
In the fifth model, we explored whether business
size accelerates the effects of network contagion and
spatial contagion on the adoption of the EHR incentive
program (Hypothesis 3). The interaction effect of
business size and spatial contagion was not statistically
significant, while the other two interaction effects were
statistically significant. Thus, the interaction effect of
business size and spatial contagion was subsequently
dropped from the fifth model. In the sixth model, both

SpatialContagion t-1

0.9995***
(0.0000)

Constant

0.0054***
(0.0003)

0.0044***
(0.0003)

0.0145***
(0.0013)

Log pseudolikelihood

-19812

-19502***

-18698***

Observations

71,024

71,024

71,024

Groups

17,756

17,756

17,756

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; SE adjusted for 3,418 clusters (locations)

Table 5: Random effects Weibull regression (cont.)

4
Hazard
Ratio
(SE)
BusinessSize

1.3531**
(0.1332)

NetworkContagion t-1

2.3715***
(0.2004)

SpatialContagion t-1

0.9995***
(0.0000)

BusinessSize x
NetworkContagion t-1

5
Hazard
Ratio
(SE)
1.8633***
(0.3248)
1.5275**
(0.2069)
0.9995***
(0.0000)
0.7074*
(0.0971)

6
Hazard
Ratio
(SE)
1.5670***
(0.1794)
1.5548**
(0.2046)
0.9994***
(0.0000)
0.6850**
(0.0952)
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BusinessSize x

0.9999

SpatialContagion t-1

(0.0000)

NetworkContagion t-1 x

1.0003***

SpatialContagion t-1
Constant

(0.0001)
0.0096***
(0.0008)

0.0098***
(0.0009)

1.0003***
(0.0001)
0.0109***
(0.0009)

Log pseudolikelihood

-18413***

-18341***

-18353***

Observations

71,024

71,024

71,024

Groups

17,756

17,756

17,756

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; SE adjusted for 3,418 clusters (locations)

Table 6: Cross-Validation Tests
AIC
BIC

Weibull
Distribution
36712.45
36778.21

Gamma
Distribution
44762.89
44828.65

Loglogistic
Distribution
44956.41
45022.17

Lognormal
Distribution
43886.89
43952.65

5. Discussion
The present study is the first research that used
healthcare provider referral networks in panel data to
examine the factors influencing the diffusion of the
EHR incentive program in Arlington and Washington
Hospital Referral Regions [30]. The results support the
first and third hypotheses but did not support the second
hypothesis. The findings indicate that healthcare
providers exposed to more prior adopters in referral
relations are more likely to adopt the EHR incentive
program. Nevertheless, spatial contagion is negatively
associated with the adoption of the EHR incentive
program, indicating that healthcare providers
geographically surrounded with more prior adopters
within 30 miles are less likely to adopt the EHR
incentive program. When specializing spatial contagion
as a moderator, healthcare providers exposed to more
prior adopters within 30 miles are more likely to adopt
the EHR incentive program. Another intriguing finding
is that business size matters, but only when network
contagion is considered. A susceptible healthcare
provider with a large business size connected with more
EHR incentive program adopters tends to increase the
likelihood of the program adoption. This often happens
when non-adopters and adopters are affiliated with the
same health care system.
The analytical approach and the findings of the
present study have several implications. First, the
analytical framework used in the present study can be
applied to understand other diffusion phenomena
including that of other health policy programs, new
drugs or therapies diffusion. Prior research explored the
association between properties of healthcare provider
referral networks and patient characteristics [31], while

other researchers examined how healthcare provider
referral networks are associated with health care
patterns [25]. For policymakers, the network analysis
approach can be used as guidance to identify key
providers that may facilitate the policy implementation
process [32]–[34]. Such a study, however, would
require collecting more data on healthcare provider
characteristics, e.g., whether the provider is a specialist
or a primary care provider.
Second, the spatial proximity theory is not
supported in our findings. One possible explanation is
the inappropriate measure of the variable. In this study,
spatial proximity is measured by spatial contagion and
is defined as the number of prior adopters within 30
miles of the provider’s location. Although 30 miles may
be appropriate for providers in the urban area in
Northern Virginia (Arlington HRR), it may be too large
for providers in the urban areas in Southern Maryland or
the District of Columbia (Washington HRR). Further
investigation on the optimal distance is warranted as
well as a sensitivity analysis with different values for the
maximum distance.
Third, the business size in our study plays a
significant role in facilitating the network contagion
process. Healthcare providers with a large business size
can be viewed as working in large hospitals, i.e., large
hospitals are expected to have a higher capacity to
implement EHR systems or handle the administrative
process of the program participation. When those
healthcare providers in a large hospital system are
exposed to more prior adopters via referral networks, the
peer pressure will influence their decisions on the
program adoption. In contrast, healthcare providers in a
small location tend to have less capacity to implement
EHR or to handle the administrative process. Even
though peer pressure can influence those healthcare
providers’ decisions to adopt the program, lack of
organizational resources may hamper the program
adoption. Furthermore, the matter of a business size
depends on the unit of analysis. In practice, the EHR
incentive program may be adopted by hospitals and then
spreads to healthcare providers. However, this study
assumed that healthcare providers are the decisionmakers of the program. Future investigation may
aggregate the data to estimate whether the network
contagion and spatial contagion still contribute to the
adoption of the EHR incentive program at the hospital
level.

6. Limitations
At present, several limitations remain unsolved and
deserve further progress. First, this study chose
Arlington and Washington HRRs as a case study to
explore how the EHR incentive programs diffuse among
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healthcare provider networks. The analysis results are
unavoidably limited to these two areas and are not
sufficient to represent the nationwide diffusion of the
program. Second, the healthcare provider network data
are only available between 2011 and 2015. The data
period restricts the time window that we could analyze.
Third, this study has not yet collected the characteristics
(e.g., locations of urbanization or cognition about the
EHR program) of healthcare providers. Those factors
are likely to contribute to the diffusion of the EHR
incentive program. Finally, the model specification has
not yet balanced data or controlled for instrumental
variables to make causal inferences. The conclusion of
this study should be only used to infer the association
between the independent variables and the dependent
variable.
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